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ABSTRACT:
France’s long history of centralized governance has generated debates as to what powers should
remain with the State and what powers should devolve to sub-national governments. To ameliorate
the fragmentation resulting from the small size of France’s 36,000 plus municipalities, called
communes, the State authorized the creation of general-purpose, inter-communal public
institutions to perform municipal functions on behalf of the communes on a greater economy of
scale. The article examines the trajectory that led to the creation in 2010 of the métropole, or
metropolis, the most recent of these inter-communal bodies that is designed to undertake public
functions in large metropolitan areas. The article first describes France’s territorial organization
of sub-national units and the decentralization movements that resulted in the devolution of more
power from the State to local and regional governments. The article presents the rationale for this
decentralization and analyzes the conditions that led to the State’s transfer of more power to the
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metropolitan level of governance. It concludes that the cooperative arrangements among the
communes, structured by inter-communal bodies, was instrumental to the creation of the métropole
with legal status. An examination of the French experience with metropolitan governance should
prove helpful to other entities or individuals engaged in the formation and evaluation of
metropolitan governments.
KEY WORDS: municipal, metropolitan, metropolis, inter-communal, territorial, governance,
economic development, urban, cooperation, innovation, sustainability, fragmentation

INTRODUCTION
As powerful economic drivers in a globalized world, cities have come under greater
scrutiny. 1 In the United States, 100 metropolitan areas generate seventy-five percent of the
nation’s gross domestic product (GDP). 2 Given the important role cities also play in the
improvement of social cohesion and the urban physical environment, scholars have asked whether
cities have been granted the powers they need to perform the myriad roles agglomeration has cast
upon them. 3 Because metropolitan governance may achieve greater economic and political
interdependency, an analysis of the new modes of regulating it should be made. 4 This article
addresses the evolutionary process that led to the creation of the French métropole (metropolis)
with legal status.
The French metropolis leaves open several questions worth exploring. Assuming this form
of urban governance increases metropolitan economic competitiveness, might other countries
explore it as a model for their global cities to explore? If so, would these cities follow an
evolutionary path toward metropolitan-wide governance similar to the French metropolis
trajectory?
In France, a debate over what powers should be devolved to local governments has been
ongoing since the 1960s when a movement to decentralize national powers began in earnest. 5 The
overly centralized State governmental apparatus came under attack as a reason why French cities,
with the exception of Paris, failed to compete effectively in European and global markets. 6 By
concentrating resources in the center close to the national seats of power, this centralization
thwarted the development of provincial urban areas. 7 Centralization of power has also been
attributed with stifling innovation from those in the closest position to find solutions to problems.8
For a number of years France has experimented with urban governance on a metropolitan
basis through inter-municipal cooperation. Experience with different forms of inter-municipal
structures led to the recent creation of the métropole, or metropolis. 9 This metropolitan-wide public
body constitutes a model worth examining for its applicability to other global cities.
The article first describes the traditional French system of centralized governance and the
sub-national governmental entities comprising it. Part II of the article then traces the
decentralization movements that led to the evolution of metropolises through the enactment of
various French laws from the 1960s through 2015. It highlights the driving forces through three
decentralization movements that reallocated some national powers to the regional and local levels
of governance. The article analyzes the different types of urban governance structures that emerged
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or changed during the decentralization movements, including the métropole. Part III of the article
points out the reasons and beliefs that underlie the French decentralization movements. Part IV
then analyzes the factors that were instrumental in the achievement of greater metropolitan
governance in France. This part also explores the applicability of these French conditions to
potential developments in support of metropolitan-wide governments in the United States.
I.

TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION OF FRANCE’S SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL BODIES
Following a feudal period in which each French province possessed territorial power
divided among land owners, the King’s agents, and the Catholic Church, French monarchs, as
exemplified by Louis XIV (1648-1715), sought to consolidate power through State intervention in
the economic sphere and the imposition of political uniformity over the provinces. 10 The French
revolution, which began in 1789, resulted in the destruction of the monarchy and the introduction
of a republican state in which the people exercise sovereign powers. 11 The National Assembly’s
Act of 14 December 1789 established a new territorial organization of municipalities, known as
communes, and departments (départements). 12
A. COMMUNES
Based on ecclesiastical parishes dating back to the tenth century, communes were
authorized to be formed with elected bodies and public law status. 13 Local relations developed
within cities and certain rural districts led to the formation of communes. 14 Today over 36,500
communes exist with 550,000 local councilors, causing considerable municipal power
fragmentation. 15 A commune may be a city with over two million inhabitants such as Paris, a
town of 10,000 people, or a small hamlet with less than 100 persons. 16 Communes bear
responsibility, in particular, for the following matters: primary schools and pre-schools, local
roads, local police, urbanism, housing, cemeteries, local social services, local transportations, and
gas and electricity networks. 17
B. DEPARTMENTS
The territory of the Republic was artificially divided into departments in 1789 to oversee
general State administration throughout France. 18 The term “department” was given to these
administrative units to signify that they were part of a larger whole. 19 They replaced ancient régime
provinces to strengthen national unity. 20 The ninety-six departments in mainland France are
sufficiently large enough to provide efficient territorial administration, but not large enough to
challenge the central state. 21 Napoleon Bonaparte’s government instituted the state prefect (préfet)
to represent the central government in each department. 22 The prefects exercised control over
local communes, implemented central government policies, and maintained public order. 23
Despite the existence of an assembly, called the General Council, at the departmental level, the
prefect until the mid-nineteenth century wielded the State’s full power; the exercise of the council’s
limited powers were subject to the prefect’s approval. 24 The departments’ functions include social
services for children, handicapped individuals, and elderly persons; secondary education; middle
schools (colleges); roads; school buses; local development; water protections; museums; libraries;
historical buildings; culture; and support for inter-municipal associations. 25
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C. REGIONS
The regions, first instituted in 1959 as territorial communities, were established as State
administrative districts to oversee economic development and coordinate national policies. 26 The
regions cover larger geographical areas than the departments, and in 2016, the regions were
reduced in number from twenty-two to thirteen. 27 In theory, matters deemed to be strategic fall
under the preserve of the regions. 28 The regions lack the status and power given to departments,
but they play a leading role in economic development, transportation, and territorial planning.29
They oversee professional education and high schools, other than the management of teachers and
programs, 30 and they exercise some competencies in the support of universities and research
centers. 31 They have been given responsibility for transportation functions outside of cities such
as regional train service. 32 Some regions own transportation facilities that include airports, canals,
and river ports. 33 In addition, environmental protection falls within their domain. 34 Regions have
also been active in promoting trans-border and international cooperation. 35 They possess no
legislative power and did not become democratically elected bodies until 1986. 36
D. INTER-COMMUNAL BODIES
In addition to the three layers of government that fall below the national level of
governance, the so-called “territorial collectivities”, the communes delegate authority to various
inter-communal bodies that assist the communes in undertaking cooperative activities among
themselves. 37 When a policy or infrastructure would benefit several communes, municipal
councils may pool resources and turn to these inter-communal structures to undertake the project
or service more effectively through economies of scale. 38 In effect, these inter-communal
authorities compensate for the inadequacies of the communal structure. 39 These entities, which
may undertake one or multi-functions, are comparable to public authorities in the United States
that usually provide only one service thought to be best performed on a regional, as opposed to a
municipal, basis. Like public authorities in the United States, these inter-communal bodies
function without representatives directly elected by the citizenry. 40 In France, however, the
communes indirectly elect the councilors for the inter-communal bodies. 41 Representatives of each
individual commune provide input on the agenda developed by these public institutions.42
Inter-communal structures may be classified as those without fiscal power and those
granted fiscal power. The traditional syndicates of communes fall into the first category. Lacking
the power to tax, the syndicates depend upon the communes for financial contributions.43
Syndicates may be created to perform a single function, most commonly waste management and
the supply of water or energy, or they may deliver several services. 44
Tax-raising inter-communal structures have been created as inter-communal public
corporations (établissements publics de co-opération intercommunale-EPCI). 45 Several different
types of these public corporations have been created, namely, (1) the community of communes
(communauté de communes), which operates primarily among rural communes; (2) the
community of agglomeration (communauté d’agglomération), aimed at middle-sized cities and
their suburbs and towns; the urban community (communauté urbaine) formed for larger cities and
their suburbs; and the new métropole, which has been created to operate in France’s major cities. 46
These permanent organizations provide “inter-communal services such as fire-fighting, waste
disposal, transport, economic development, [and] housing.” 47 The inter-communal authorities
manage some services previously under the domain of the communes, such as garbage collection
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or transportation, but by law they are also mandated to oversee “other areas such as economic
planning and development, housing projects, or environmental protection.” 48
E. METROPOLISES
Law No. 2010-1563 of 16 December 2010 created the métropole as a new inter-communal
public institution. 49 It was envisioned as a body that would bring several municipalities together
to undertake developments covering “economic, ecological, educational, cultural and social
development of their territory in order to improve their competitiveness and cohesion.” 50 The
metropolis was conceived as a step beyond the existing inter-communal bodies in that it was
created to address large urbanized areas and make them economically competitive on a European
and global basis. 51 Planning, in particular, was laid at the doorstep of the metropolis: it “is fully
associated with the drafting, revision and modification of planning and planning diagrams and
documents for planning, economic development and innovation, transport and the environment,
[and] higher education.” 52
The metropolis is granted powers in place of its member municipalities in the areas of
economic development, tourism, culture, higher education, research institutions, research
programs, and in the development and management of a range of facilities, including those relating
to tourism, ports, airports, and sports. 53 It is empowered to develop metropolitan plans, create
public spaces, operate telecommunications networks, facilitate mobility, establish housing policy,
and improve the built housing stock. 54 The State has also authorized metropolises to provide a
range of services, including those relating to sanitation and water, cemeteries, slaughterhouses,
fire and rescue, waste disposal, and the distribution of electricity and gas. 55 Metropolises have
been granted extensive powers relating to the protection and development of the environment that
include such disparate areas as air pollution, noise pollution, energy control and demand,
renewable energy production, climate-air-energy plans, flood prevention, beaches, and aquatic
environments. 56 Other powers may be delegated to metropolises by the State, or by agreement
with the department or region. 57
II.

FRENCH TERRITORIAL DECENTRALIZATION

A. FIRST STAGE OF DECENTRALIZATION (1982-1983)
Until the 1980s, the exercise of governmental power in France was centralized. 58 In
classical French republicanism, the role played by local authorities did not promote democracy or
represent community interests; rather, it was supposed “to integrate the periphery into a highly
centralized system.” 59 Government signified sovereignty and its affairs were carried out at the
center, not at the fringes. 60 In practice, powerful local notables obtained resources from the central
state in exchange for providing valuable local information. 61 In 1981, the election of a socialist
President, François Mitterrand, led to the first so-called decentralization movement that made
changes to the distribution of power and resources from the national government. 62
The Act of 2 March 1982 introduced three important changes: (1) the administrative
stewardship of the department prefect, who had served as both the department’s executive and
State representative until 1982, was replaced by a checks and balances system in which the
administrative courts and the regional courts of audit worked with the department prefect to
oversee territorial governmental functions; 63 (2) the executive power exercised by the departments
and regions was transferred from the prefect to the president of the departments and regions, the
president being elected by the council of the department or region; 64 and (3) regions were officially
granted legal status, and the regional councils, first created in 1972, became elected bodies with
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enhanced decision-making powers. 65 In 1984, the French local government civil service was
created in connection with the decentralization process, and it includes employment in the three
layers of sub-national government: commune, department, and region. 66
Until the 1982 decentralization measures, the prefect served as both the department’s State
representative and executive. 67 The transfer of executive power from the prefect to the president
of the department or region required a separation of those services of a State nature that stayed
under the prefect’s authority and those newly devolved to the president of the department or
region. 68 The 1982 reform has been characterized as involving both decentralization and deconcentration. 69 Decentralization entails the vertical transfer of State power to elected local
political authorities in specific areas whereas de-concentration involves the internal horizontal
shifting of central powers so as to ensure continued State control. 70
To prevent the undermining of the State’s influence through its representatives in the
department, de-concentration measures were implemented to strengthen the authority of the State’s
agent, the prefect, who exercises authority over representatives of the various State ministries in
the department. 71 The prefect chairs local administrative committees and remains the only
authority empowered to commit State expenditures in the department under his jurisdiction. 72 A
prefect must undertake a number of different roles—she can submit local council acts to the
administrative courts if she deems them illegal; she implements and enforces legislation; and she
must prepare State services in her department for all eventualities, including natural disasters. 73
The prefect must explain State policy to local constituents and provide data as needed, roles that
cast this official into a public relations officer. At the same time, a prefect must ensure that the
department’s elected officials do not encroach on the State’s powers. 74 Successful prefects serve
as problem solvers, mediators, and communication links between the State and territorial bodies. 75
The role of the prefect is alien, however, to the system of local government in the United
States where state governments possess their own distinct powers, separate from the federal
government. 76 States create their own local governments as they see fit and delegate powers to
them. 77 In most cases the locality exercises such delegated powers on its own accord. 78 In France,
two separate administrations work side by side in the departments and regions—one represents the
territorial body and the other is comprised of State representatives. 79
B. SECOND STAGE OF DECENTRALIZATION (2003-2004)
Constitutional reform constituted the first phase of the second decentralization
movement. 80 The Constitution (17 March 2003) granted constitutional recognition to the regions
and included them as one of the four territorial authorities. 81 In addition, to making the regions
permanent, the Constitution recognized authorities with a “special status,” a category including
the different public inter-communal bodies (EPICs). 82 Further, the Constitution made specific
reference to the decentralized organization of the French Republic, 83 introducing the principle of
financial autonomy for the sub-national authorities. 84 Reference was also made in the Constitution
to future merging of the sub-national authorities into larger units. 85
The Act on the Decentralized Organization of the Republic established the different tiers
of sub-national authorities as part of France’s institutional organization and guaranteed their
competency in certain areas, enabling these territorial bodies to fulfill their responsibilities.86
Three other significant acts were passed during the first decentralization phase: “[t]he Act on the
financial autonomy of sub-national government tiers. . . , the Act on experimentation by local
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governments, [footnote omitted] and the Act on local referendums. . . .” 87 The latter Act allowed
local referenda. 88
The second legislative phase began with the enactment of the 13 August 2004 Act that
provided for significant transfers of State responsibilities to the sub-national governments and their
cooperative structures, the so-called “functional reforms.” 89 The decentralization reforms
established three general areas of decision-making (blocs de compétences) to be carried out by the
different sub-national tiers: immediate proximity, intermediate proximity, and strategic. 90 Matters
deemed to be strategic lie in the competence of the regions: “economic development, vocational
training, infrastructure, some secondary education, some transport (and regional rail services since
2002), with additional responsibilities in culture and the environment.” 91 Matters of intermediate
proximity fall under the jurisdiction of the departments that deliver major services including social
assistance, social services, roads, and some secondary education. 92 The communes and various
inter-communal bodies are granted jurisdiction over matters of immediate proximity, which
include low-level social assistance, planning permits, and waste disposal. 93
In practice, the spheres of competence are overlapping and not always respected as the
communes, departments, and regions compete with each other and design their policies to appeal
to their electorates. 94 Moreover, because no formal hierarchy exists among the sub-national units,
no single authority can exercise control over another or prevent the adoption of policies in
competition with its own priorities. 95 French regions, for example, are dependent upon the cooperation of the geographically smaller sub-national authorities for the successful outcome of their
own policies. 96
C. THIRD STATE OF DECENTRALIZATION (2010-2015)
Various deficiencies in the performance of local governmental functions continued to
persist even after the second phase of decentralization. A decree by President Nicolas Sarkozy,
under date of 22 October 2008, established a committee for local government reform, appointed
former Prime Minister Edouard Balladur as chair, and stated the need for such report as follows:
The time to study and decide on a profound reform of local government has come.
Everyone agrees that the current situation is unsatisfactory: proliferation of
decision-making levels, confusion in the division of powers, lack of clarity in the
allocation of resources, . . . uniformity of the rules applied to all the collectivities
whatever their situation, complication resulting from all the efforts made rightly to
incite the communities to cooperate with each other. This results in multiple
disadvantages: cumbersome procedures, increased costs, ineffective public
interventions and ultimately, distance from citizens. 97
The Balladur Committee report (Report), published in March 2009, in effect, announced a
third stage of French decentralization. 98 The Report set forth reasons in support of further State
decentralization. Foremost, was the recognition that France’s urban areas needed to be structured
so as to enable them to compete effectively in European and global markets. 99 The Report
described the existing territorial organization as complex, costly, and deficient in fulfilling the
needs of constituents. 100 Although the Republic’s governmental structure had accomplished
national unity and deepened local rights and freedom through previous decentralization measures,
the organization of local authorities had grown more complex through the multiplication of
institutions of inter-municipal cooperation since 1999. 101 The failure to examine the type of
competencies exercised by different local governmental units as well as their funding, had resulted,
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according to the Report, in a loss of efficiency with respect to public actions and services,
unnecessary taxpayer burdens, and a lack of transparency. 102
The Report further decried the failure to reduce territorial fragmentation, pointing out that
between 1950 and 2007 France had only decreased the number of municipalities by 5% whereas
the reduction of municipalities during that time period was 41% in Germany and 79% in the United
Kingdom. 103 It pointed out that structures of territorial administration had not adapted to urban
growth and lifestyles marked by “mobility and a strong demand for market services, transportation,
family services, culture and recreation.” 104 The division of powers between the mayors of
communes and the councilors general of the departments made it extremely difficult to develop
coherent urban policy. 105 The Report noted that “with a few exceptions no competence is
specialized by level of territorial administration and most are shared between local authorities or
between them and the State.” 106
Finding the territorial administrative structures to be too numerous and fragmented, the
Report lamented the failure of the 36,000 communes to merge and remarked that their geographical
boundary lines often defied rationality. 107 The statutory diversity of the communities of
communes, communities of agglomeration, and urban communities resulted not only in
complexity and rigidity, but also failed to produce the economies of scale expected. Concern was
expressed that the public institutions of inter-communal cooperation (EPCI), some of which
exercised powers of a quasi-general competence, remained with indirect suffrage. 108
The Report concluded that the regions had not accomplished the objectives sought by their
creation, stating “that their relatively high numbers, limited financial weight and scattered skills
are not in keeping with their role in the ongoing reorganization of State, which favors the regional
level.” 109 Departments were criticized as poorly adapted to meet the needs of highly urbanized
areas, and cantons, smaller units within the departments, were described as obsolete. 110 Equally as
important, was the assessment that institutional coordination between the regions and departments
had not met with real success. 111
The Report found that the simplification of local governmental structures sought might
result in two levels of administration: a regional level dedicated to the management of territorial
development and activities, and an inter-communal level to meet the service needs of the
population. 112 Laying the foundation for the métropole, the Report indicated that much thinking
had gone into the creation of the “commune of the twenty-first century,” which was described as
a new local authority grounded at the inter-communal level of governance. 113 In the spirit of
transparency, the Report’s authors opined that such inter-communality could not be fully realized
without making fundamental changes to the existing sub-national structures, including a
redefinition of the departments’ role. 114
The Report favored granting general competence to municipalities, much like the role of
municipalities in the United States, called general purpose governments, which provide a
comprehensive set of governmental services to protect their residents’ health and welfare. 115 It
advocated that the exercise of specialized skills should be delegated to other governmental entities.
This proposed structure was found advantageous in that several localities would be precluded from
exercising identical powers within the same territory. 116
Finally, the Report’s Introduction concluded that local governance structural reforms
would be ineffectual without new fiscal measures and a clearer tax system. 117 Although the
decentralization reforms in 2003 had established the principle of financial autonomy for local
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authorities, they remained unable to finance their expenditures in a complete way. 118 Uncertainties
remained as to the extent of local financial autonomy, and an excess of cross-financing continued
even as local expenditures continued to increase. 119
The Balladur Committee recommended twenty proposals that covered a number of areas
of concern, including suggested structural local government reforms, electoral rules, local
government finance, and the creation of new forms of metropolitan governance. 120 To increase
efficiency, the Report proposed reducing the number of regions from twenty-two to fifteen and
merging departments into larger entities. 121 It proposed the expansion of institutions of intermunicipal cooperation to cover all of France’s territory and argued in favor of the direct election
of these bodies. 122 The Report recommended that only communes and the EPCI be favored by the
principle of “free administration of local authorities,” which authorizes local authorities to
intervene in areas as they chose. 123 It suggested that clarifications be made with respect to the
division of responsibilities between the State and local authorities and between the regions and the
departments. 124 It favored making clearer the areas in which either the regions or the departments
would have exclusive or primary jurisdiction. 125 Proposal number eleven envisioned that the clause
of general competence should rest at the municipal or metropolitan level of governance with
specialized competencies to be exercised by the departments and regions. 126 The Report favored a
reduction of State field services. 127
The Report’s significant accomplishment lay in creating the intellectual foundation for the
métropole as a new metropolitan based, inter-communal body to exercise competencies transferred
to it from communes, departments, and regions. 128 The Report advocated removing the communes’
status as autonomous local authorities, but well aware that removal of the communes’ general
competencies would spark opposition, it left open an alternative plan that would allow the
communes to retain their legal status within the metropolitan framework. 129 The new metropolises
were envisioned as delivering city-wide services, including the social and welfare services
traditionally delivered by departments. The Report proposed that the first group of eleven
metropolises be created by 2014. 130 The Report also urged the creation of a “Grand Paris,” a large
new metropolis with a jurisdiction encompassing the City of Paris and several departments. 131
President Sarkozy initiated the first piece of legislation to implement some of the Balladur
Report recommendations. 132 The Law on the Reform of Territorial Authorities of 16 December
2010, known as RCT, provided for the creation of a métropole as a public body through agreement
between and among public institutions in inter-communal co-operation and granted it powers of
taxation.133 Limited to large, urban areas of more than 500,000 inhabitants, the RCT granted the
status of metropolis to bodies so created. 134 Further aims of the 2010 law were to clarify
competences among the sub-national levels of government, simplify their structures, and facilitate
local taxation reform. 135 The City of Nice became France’s first official metropolis pursuant to
the 16 December 2010 law. 136
Although the third stage of decentralization lost momentum following the enactment of the
16 December 2010 law, the election of President François Hollande in 2012 led to the enactment
of three new pieces of legislation. 137 The first law known as the MAPTAM law (modernisation
de l'action publique territoriale et d'affirmation des métropoles), promulgated on 27 January 2014,
clarified the responsibilities of local and regional authorities. 138 Secondly, MAPTAM created a
new legal status for the metropolises. 139 By affirming the role of the metropolis as a specific
regime, MAPTAM reinforced the importance of urban dynamics. 140 MAPTAM provided for the
creation of a metropolis in Paris, Lyon, and Marseille as special cases with specific provisions that
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related to them only. 141 MAPTAM also provided for the creation of a larger number of so-called
“common law” metropolises, which are defined as
a public institution of intercommunal co-operation with own taxation uniting
several communes in one piece and without enclave within a space of solidarity to
elaborate and to lead together a project of development and economic, ecological,
educational development, cultural and social aspects of their territory in order to
improve their cohesion and competitiveness and to contribute to sustainable and
inclusive development of the regional territory. It promotes metropolitan economic
functions, its transport networks and its university resources, research and
innovation, in a spirit of regional and interregional cooperation and with a view to
balanced territorial development. 142
MAPTAM reformed the status of metropolises first authorized by the law of 16 December
2010.
It authorized the creation of a number of metropolises in large urban areas by providing
for the transformation of public institutions of inter-communal cooperation with taxation powers
into metropolises. 144 A metropolis, the most integrated form of local inter-communality, may be
formed by decree in territories with a population of more than 400,000 that are located in urban
areas of more than 650,000 inhabitants. 145 Metropolises may be initiated by city decision
makers. 146 As of January 1, 2018, nineteen cities have been reorganized as metropolises under
MAPTAM’s general provisions for metropolises, and Paris and Aix-Marseille-Provence have been
formed as metropolises with special status. 147 The Lyon metropolis, also established with a special
status under MAPTAM, possesses a more integrated metropolitan form and is not an intercommunality. 148
143

A third piece of legislation, the Nouvelle Organisation Territoriale de la République
(NOTRe), promulgated on 7 August 2015, entrusted the regions with new competencies and
redefined the competencies granted to each territorial collectivity. 149 NOTRe removed the general
jurisdiction clause for departments and regions, thereby eliminating their right to intervene in all
subject areas. 150 Instead, the clause of general competence was vested exclusively in the commune
so as to “avoid unnecessary spending when multiple levels of communities are competing in a
single area of action.” 151 The NOTRe reforms further increased the power of the intercommunalities in anticipation of the further integration of public operations on an inter-municipal
scale. 152 Another law (law of 16 January 2015), which took effect on January 1, 2016, reduced
the number of regions from twenty-two to thirteen. 153
III.

RATIONALE FOR METROPOLITAN GOVERNANCE

The previously discussed Balladur Report provided a number of reasons in favor of the
decentralization of power from the State to sub-national entities, including metropolises. The view
that economic competitiveness could best be achieved by granting more power to sub-national
public institutions constituted a widely accepted theory for decentralization. 154 The enhancement
of democracy that could be achieved by granting greater freedom of management to local officials
embodied an equally compelling argument. 155
Metropolitan government has not taken hold in the United States due to a preference for
localism. 156 Municipal officials generally oppose the creation of a metropolitan-wide government
because they do not want to lose any authority. 157 In addition, suburban and higher-income
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communities may oppose the formation of a government on a metropolitan scale because they
have no desire to help finance central city infrastructure or the cost of providing social and
economic support for those less affluent inner-city residents. 158 Thus, it may be instructive to
examine some of the reasons why French lawmakers viewed the creation of metropolises more
favorably than their counterparts in the United States.
A number of commentators have argued that the French métropole should be instituted and
strengthened for the following reasons: (1) enhancement of territorial competitiveness and
economic growth; (2) increased political cohesion at the metropolitan level through an integrated
metropolitan structure; (3) opportunities for greater innovation; and (4) the necessity to build more
sustainable and coherent metropolitan spaces. The article next discusses these views that favor the
creation of the metropolis.
Large-scaled urbanized areas have become the primary geographic unit underpinning the
global economy. 159 If the economy operates over the larger metropolitan area encompassing more
territory than just the geographical area of the central city, a broader range of private and public
actors can be mobilized to generate economic growth. 160 Metropolitan economies of scale are said
to be the pillars of industrial policy in Italy as well as in France because they enable networking
and the building of innovation systems on a territorial basis. 161 The Paris métropole (Métropole
du Grand Paris, MGP), the first French inter-communal structure that combined the central city
and its suburbs, for example, can spur new economic growth by demonstrating its commitment to
further science, technology, and market linkages as part of its economic strategy to create new
companies and jobs. 162
Political structures integrated on a metropolitan-wide basis possess the advantage of being
able to set a coherent political agenda that can promote economic development, protect the
environment, and improve social cohesion. 163 A metropolis should be able to strengthen intercommunal cooperation that will vitalize the region’s territorial competitiveness and
attractiveness. 164 Paris’s transformation from a city center and outlying suburbs into a métropole
grew out of territorial coalitions that sought to strengthen the role of Paris as a major world city.165
Operating on a metropolitan scale was viewed as necessary to attract State investment in large
infrastructure projects costing billions of euros, such as the light-rail network to link the Paris
region’s communes in a circular orbit. 166 Major cities are now positioning themselves as global
cities that spearhead economic development for their wider region. 167
The issue of innovation has become framed at the metropolitan level. 168 The European
Council, meeting in Lisbon, Portugal, in March 2000, laid out the so-called “Lisbon Strategy” that
called for the integration and coordination of research activities to foster innovation as a key
component of economic policy. 169 This document cautioned that the Lisbon Strategy objectives
should be pursued in a flexible and decentralized manner. 170
Innovation stems from mobilizing the activities of a diverse group of people whether from
business, the government, or universities. 171 These actors frequently connect through networks
better facilitated on a broader basis than the geographical jurisdiction of one local government. 172
In addition, the specialization and resources necessary to spur innovation will more likely be found
on a metropolitan scale. 173 Innovation has been found to be overwhelmingly present in
metropolitan areas where it is accompanied by strong human capital, modern infrastructure, and
places that prize quality. 174
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A metropolitan-wide planning framework can also improve the quality of life in urban
areas and create a more sustainable environment. More coherent metropolitan spaces can be built
when guided by a larger territorial plan that extends beyond the reach of one municipality. The
European Commission’s Initiative on Smart Cities and Communities calls for integrated planning
as a key component to achieve greater sustainability in the areas of urban mobility, the built
environment, and infrastructure. 175 Integrated planning, according to the Commission, will
succeed only if it involves “greater collaboration within and across traditional administrative and
industry boundaries.” 176 Planning on a metropolitan scale enables setting aside areas for parks and
open space buffers to improve sustainability and livability in dense urban areas. 177 In the absence
of such planning, uncontrolled development takes place. 178 Metropolitan-wide planning should
result in connected greenways spanning a number of municipalities as well as prevent parochial
land use policies that thwart balanced, reasonable growth management. 179
IV.

METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENTS’ FUTURE:
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FRENCH MÉTROPOLE

LESSONS

LEARNED

FROM

THE

Some of the developments that led to the creation of the French métropole have previously
been traced in the article. A complete analysis of the benefits and detriments of metropolitan
governance are beyond the scope of the article, but it seems likely that more metropolitan-wide
governmental structures will be created in other countries. The article next addresses what
conditions, given the French experience, might pave the way to greater adoption of this form of
governance.
A. INTER-MUNICIPAL PUBLIC BODIES TO AMELIORATE THE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF
MUNICIPAL FRAGMENTATION THROUGH JOINT MUNICIPAL FUNCTIONS ON A
METROPOLITAN SCALE
Cooperation among the French communes over many decades to combine resources was a
key factor in the development of the concept of a métropole. Due to the small size of the
communes and the significant number of them, inter-municipal cooperation became a necessity
for the provision of needed public services and goods. Authorization for the creation of intercommunal structures, which operate on a greater economy of scale than the communes, facilitated
joint communal projects and services. By working together, the communes most likely built
stronger relationships among themselves and came to realize the benefits of inter-municipal
cooperation. Thus, from the French experience, one can surmise that metropolitan governance can
best be built upon pre-existing cooperative arrangements among municipalities.
In particular, the creation of the public institution of inter-communal cooperation (EPCI)
with general powers and tax-raising ability established a successful prototype for the later
métropole. Still lacking institutional status as a fully operational local government, the French
metropolis follows the path of the EPCIs. 180 In fact, with the exception of Lyon, a fully fledged
local authority that exercises extensive powers over the communes within its territorial reach,181
most French metropolises take the form of the EPCI with taxing powers. 182 Metropolises have
been described as “EPCIs that bring together communes in a contiguous and uninterrupted unit to
form an entity of over 400,000 inhabitants, in an urban area of 650,000 inhabitants.” 183 Marseille’s
metropolis was formed by the merger of six EPCIs into a single EPCI structure. 184
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In the United States, nearly all the states have enacted enabling legislation that authorizes
intergovernmental cooperation. 185 In some instances, cities have joined together to create a
separate public authority to undertake a joint project on their behalf. 186 Voluntary regional councils
of government, regional planning agencies, and metropolitan planning organizations, also exist.187
Nonetheless, the latter primarily provide advice on regional planning rather than carry out
metropolitan-wide functions. 188 Only the Portland, Oregon’s Metropolitan Service District
(Metro) and the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council operate on a scale comparable to the
métropole. 189 Instead, the states rely upon single-purpose regional agencies, which generally do
not interact with the citizenry, to address problems arising from fragmented local governments.190
Due to their narrow focus on the provision of only one public service, single-purpose
agencies have been criticized for failing to coordinate and implement their activities with other
governmental entities. 191 In effect, single-purpose regional bodies undercut rather than promote
the type of municipal cooperation that would lead to creation of metropolitan-wide governance. 192
In sharp contrast, the EPCIs, formed as “public administrative bodies for intermunicipal
cooperation . . . with their own tax system,” are general-purpose bodies deemed essential for the
promotion of cooperation rather than competition among cities and towns. 193
B. BELIEF THAT METROPOLITAN GOVERNANCE MAKES URBAN CENTERS MORE
ECONOMICALLY COMPETITIVE IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY
Since the 1960s the desirability of building metropolitan frameworks has been actively
debated in France. 194 Various decentralization policies and high-profile national reports, such as
the Balladur Report, have kept alive the issue of finding the right balance between national,
regional, and local authority. 195 Paris’s success as a global city spurred initiatives to create strong
metropolitan governments in other French regional urban areas to both counteract Paris’s
dominance and to make them competitive in European and international economies. 196 This policy,
known as “métropoles d’equilibre,” of counterbalancing Paris’s predominance by strengthening
other regional centers, resulted in the creation, in 1963, of a State agency, known as DATAR
(délégation à l’aménagement du territoire et à l’action régionale) (Delegation for Territorial
Development and Regional Actions), 197 that stimulated metropolitan planning. 198 Thinking and
planning beyond the municipal order appears to have been widely accepted as necessary to tackle
agglomeration effects. 199 Pro-metropolitan advocacy served to justify urban reforms and the
creation of the EPCIs. 200
In contrast, in the United States, little debate occurs about the complexities of finding the
right-sized metropolitan or municipal structures. In public policy areas outside of the federal
domain, the states as sovereign bodies possess the freedom to develop their own local
governmental structures and metropolitan preferences. 201 The federal government’s dismantling,
in 1996, of its Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, which had conducted
studies on intergovernmental relations among federal, state, and local units of government,
demonstrated its lack of interest in intergovernmental coordination. 202 The federal government,
however, has made some attempts to encourage regional planning by making federal transportation
funding contingent upon the creation of metropolitan planning organizations. 203 Non-public bodies
fill some of the metropolitan debate void. The Brookings Institution, a nonprofit policy
organization, through its Metropolitan Policy Program, serves as a strong advocate for
metropolitan-wide solutions to urban problems. 204

Published by Reading Room, 2017

32

Journal of Comparative Urban Law and Policy, Vol. 2 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 3

C. SUPPORT OF
GOVERNANCE

THE

FRENCH

NATIONAL

GOVERNMENT

FOR

METROPOLITAN

The French government’s willingness to spearhead and experiment with metropolitan-wide
solutions to municipal fragmentation led to the eventual creation of the métropole. The French
Ministry of the Interior, responsible for relations between the State and local governments,
possesses the institutional clout to set urban policy. 205 DATAR, as a State planning agency, was
actively involved in promoting metropolitan-wide solutions to urban problems; it favored, for
example, the creation of a Greater Paris planning project that launched a vast transport
infrastructure project in 2007. 206
As outlined earlier in the article, numerous decentralization reform movements occurred
over the past fifty years. Different institutional forms of inter-municipal cooperation evolved to
address the effects of agglomeration. 207 It has been hypothesized that “the potential for
metropolitan reform increases with the degree of prior institutionalisation of the local political
scene.” 208
The French national government has also shown a willingness to intervene, if necessary,
to ensure the creation of integrated metropolises. 209 Such was the case with respect to Marseille
when Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault, in 2012, firmly steered the creation of the Aix-MarseilleProvence metropolis. 210 The French State, however, has shown flexibility in letting local
governments shape the metropolis’s contours. 211 In Lyon, an integrated métropole, exercising the
powers of both a municipality and a department, is in place due to a prominent role played by the
pre-existing Urban Community and an alliance formed by two leading local politicians.212
Marseille, on the other hand, remains as an EPCI, a more loosely formed metropolis with weaker
control over its six territorial components, following their merger as six EPCIs into one. 213
In the United States, state legislatures have shown little willingness to debate the issues of
centralized metropolitan planning and the creation of multi-purpose metropolitan governments to
undertake regional functions such as transit, housing, solid waste disposal, sewerage, water supply,
wastewater treatment, and climate change adaptation. 214 Local politicians can be expected to resist
metropolitan controls because they weaken or displace their power. 215 State legislators have
withered in the face of such vested interests when joined by other powerful localism coalitions,
including prosperous suburbanites, county officials, and those seeking to distance themselves from
inner-city poverty and racial minorities. 216 Suburban legislators, for example, put an end to the
“Boston—1915” metropolitan campaign that proposed a metropolitan body with purview over
land-use planning, zoning, transportation, and parks. 217
D. RECEPTIVITY TO PLANNING AS AN INSTRUMENT
IMPROVE ECOLOGICAL SUSTAINABILITY

TO

MANAGE URBAN GROWTH

AND

Planning on a metropolitan-wide basis underpins the rationale for metropolitan
governance. The problems of coordinating regional functions between the City of Paris and the
suburban municipalities surrounding it, received the attention of the State as early as 1910. 218
Recognizing cross-communal interdependence between Paris and its Seine suburbs, the
department of the Seine steered the coordination of urban policies and organized inter-municipal
service delivery. 219 It “staked its legitimacy on coordinating urban planning policy.” 220 By the
1930s, the State’s intervention in urban planning resulted in the creation of its own bureaucratic
units devoted to the development of the Parisian region. 221 Growth management was not limited
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to Paris. In 1919, the enactment of national legislation required municipalities of over 10,000
inhabitants to develop a growth plan. 222 France has been considered a “pioneer in the field of
spatial policies” since the 1960s. 223
Urban planning entails faith in experts drawn from a number of different fields, including
transport, engineering, housing, demography, and urban planning. The coordination of urban
policy between departmental and municipal governments resulted in an accumulation of
knowledge about the phenomenon relating to urban interdependence that led to the elaboration of
urban development laws. 224 The reliance upon and sharing of this urban expertise undoubtedly
assisted in the development of new French forms of urban governance. 225
In the United States, metropolitan governance in which a general-purpose regional
government exercises control over urban planning and the imposition of growth management
controls for the entire region has yet to materialize. 226 Federal aid formulas and other incentives,
however, have resulted in some metropolitan integration such as the sharing of an airport between
Dallas and Fort Worth, Texas. 227 Because land uses in the United States are regulated largely at
the local level, “no European-style central government . . . can make regions do right and eat their
planning spinach.” 228 In the 1990s, a state-directed approach to urban planning was viewed as
fairly new, 229 but today more states now require planning. 230 Thus, more credence in the
desirability of urban planning is emerging in the United States, albeit slowly.
E. DECISION MAKERS WITH LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXPERIENCE
In France, the practice of multiple office holding can result in a better understanding of
urban governance issues. Michel Mercier and Gérard Collomb, for example, were both members
of the national Senate and prominent local politicians, serving as Mayor of Lyon and President of
Urban Community/Grand Lyon, respectively, at the time they brokered the creation of the Lyon
metropolis. 231 Nicolas Sarkozy served as Mayor of Neuilly-sur-Seine, Minister of the Budget,
Minister of the Interior, and Minister of Finances before his election to the French presidency. 232
Whereas many early United States presidents served at the state and local levels of government
before assuming national office, mass media has enabled the election of federal office holders
without any prior experience at the local level. Thus, the French form of governance would seem
to outpace that of the United States in the election of officials with an understanding of urban
growth issues.
CONCLUSION
Nations depend upon general-purpose local governments to perform a range of public
services and to administer regulations in furtherance of the public health, safety, and welfare.
These governmental units, often formed during eras of less agglomeration, frequently do not
possess the territorial size to undertake these functions expeditiously. Today, many governmental
operations must be conducted on a regional basis overlapping municipal boundary lines. In
France, the State has authorized communes, French municipalities, to create inter-communal
structures tasked with performing joint services or projects on their behalf. Although these intercommunal public institutions are similar to public authorities in the United States, they are likely
to be more closely connected to municipal governance because they perform functions delegated
to them by the communes. In addition, many French inter-communal bodies provide a range of
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services whereas in the United States most metropolitan public authorities are assigned only one
function, such as transit service or the supply of water.
Over several decades, France’s experience with inter-communal cooperative efforts led to
the creation of the French métropole, a more integrated inter-communal entity created specifically
to perform governmental functions in large urban, metropolitan areas. Through several
decentralization movements, a rationale emerged for the delegation of more powers to a generalpurpose public institution operating on a metropolitan-wide basis. French national leaders strongly
believed that State decentralization of power would result in greater territorial competitiveness and
economic growth. To their way of thinking, sub-national units of government were in the best
position to stimulate innovation given political and economic interdependency on a metropolitan
scale. In addition, the greater territorial reach of a metropolitan public body was felt to expedite
the institution of a framework to build a more sustainable physical environment.
France’s experience with inter-communal structures, including the métropole, prove
instructive. The knowledge gained from French decentralization reforms sheds light on the type
of developments that facilitate the institution of metropolitan-wide governance. The article argues
that the following conditions, based on the French experience, most likely produce greater
receptivity to the institutionalization of the metropolis: (1) the existence of joint municipal
cooperative activities overseen by an inter-municipal public institution that gains respect through
effective and transparent operations; (2) belief that the metropolis will improve economic
competitiveness by operating on the same scale as the regional networks underlying the global
economy; (3) State support and incentives for inter-communal cooperation; (4) willingness to rely
on more centralized planning and expertise to make metropolitan government competitive; and (5)
political leaders willing to promote metropolitan governance through their understanding of its
advantages. While each country will pave its own particular path to metropolitan governance,
France’s experience provides useful insights on both the circumstances that enhance the creation
of metropolitan governance as well as the obstacles its proponents face.
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